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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOL. 4 DECEMBER, 1929 No. 1
FIXED INVESTMENT TRUSTS - SOME
OBSERVATIONS
NE of the most startling developments in the financial
history of the United States has taken place in the last
three years. The world has been in the stock market. The
financial page is carefully studied on the street corners. The
tabloids run tip columns. The public wants stocks; the pub-
lic must have stocks; and, in one form or another, the public
gets stocks. Whether the Great Break of October 28th and
29th has dulled this appetite remains to be seen.
Necessarily the conventional mode of obtaining new cap-
ital has changed. Bond issues are not popular unless a con-
vertible feature is added, the company paying a correspond-
ingly low amount of interest, and the purchaser obtaining the
gamble (conservative or otherwise) he demands. Preferred
stock is often brought out with the attraction of additional
participation in earnings or else is made convertible into the
more speculative common stock. Such developments mean
new problems for the lawyer and additional grist to his mill,
but even so, the salient problems, new perhaps to this genera-
tion, have been considered before. The territory is not en-
tirely virgin ground; there are at least some precedents that
can be resurrected, dusted off, revamped and introduced to
care for the emergency.
During this same period,-and probably due to the all-
consuming desire of the moneyed public, no matter how con-
servative, to get aboard the bull market-investment trusts
(so-called) have become a vital factor. These are of two main
types, the management trust and the fixed trust.
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The fixed investment trust, sometimes called "contrac-
tual" trusts, some of the problems of which are discussed in
this paper, must not be confused with managerial or specula-
tive trusts, sometimes called "statutory" trusts, long known
in the United States and originally imported from England.
Such organizations, although commonly designated "invest-
ment trusts," aret formed for the purpose of concentrating
large capital under one management with broad discretion-
ary powers, which, in the present highly developed form, per-
mits wide diversification . and constant change of invest-
ment with unlimited opportunities for speculative "trading,"
rather than true investment. And, indeed, the modern devel-
opment, rather than choosing a true trust as the vehicle of
operation, seems to be toward the corporate structure. Espe-
cially is this true in the state of New York, where, probably
because of some doubt as to the applicability and operation
of the rule against restraints on alienation, the corporate
form has been, to the best of the writer's observation, the sole
form. A corporation can readily be organized for this pur-
pose by the inclusion of wide powers pertaining to the pur-
chase, holding and sale of the securities of other corporations
and by a proper intra-corporate structure. Such organiza-
tions, whether true trusts or trading corporations, are usu-
ally frank to admit that their raison d'etre is speculation on
a tremendous scale, the success of which depends entirely
upon the ability of the Board of Directors and the Manage-
ment in the speculative field. Such organizations are as good
as their management,-and no better. Whether they are a
power for good or evil is beyond the scope of this paper. Their
success cannot be denied.
Characteristics and Administration of Fixed Trusts.
The Fixed Investment Trust is entirely different. As its
name implies, it is fixed; there is no opportunity for change
in underlying securities except in specific emergencies, de-
scribed in the trust indenture with great detail. The vehicle
chosen is invariably that of the true trust set-up. Its future
in no way depends upon its management for it has no man-
agement similar to that of the speculative organization. Its
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strength is that of its underlying securities and in proper ad-
ministration of the fixed portfolio by the trustee pursuant to
the terms of the trust agreement. It is not a speculation, and,
in the opinion of the writer, it bids fair to win a place among
the popular and leading classes of pure investment. It offers
the investor a participating ownership in a carefully selected
group of common stocks, chosen for their dividend record,
their earning capacity, and their general soundness 1 from
which he is led to expect a reasonable return and modest ap-
preciation. The fixed investment trust seems to have become
fully established as a permanent feature in American finance,
-sufficiently so to warrant an examination into some of the
problems that confront the attorney to whom is entrusted the
task of constructing the machinery necessary to reach the re-
quired result and to provide proper administration after or-
ganization. The writer does not delude himself into the belief
that he will present the solution of these problems. Some of
them, particularly those respecting taxation, can only be defi-
nitely closed by the decision of the proper court of last resort;
others will find solution in legislation before the courts have
had an opportunity to act. The scheme of the fixed trust is
believed to be new. Certainly it has developed into something
definitely American; unlike the managerial trusts or trading
companies, nothing exactly like the present device can be
found prior to the present decade. According to one author-
ity 2, the present form as commonly used is a variation of an
'The sponsors of North American Trust Shares have demonstrated to the
writer that no stock was considered eligible for the portfolio of that successful
enterprise unless (a) it had paid consecutive dividends for at least thirteen
years, (b) was rated A or better by Moody, (c) was listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, and (d) otherwise fitted in with the trust's scheme of diversi-
fication and generally contributed to the soundness of the resulting security as
an investment. Other trusts have contented themselves with the leading com-
panies in a given industry. Cf. Bank Stock Trust Shares; Insuranshares Trust
Certificates; Automotive Participation Shares. Some have even specialized in a
group within an industry. Cf. Trustee Standard Oilshares, the portfolio of
which is made up entirely from stocks of the so-called Standard Oil group
of companies.
It should be needless to say that reference to a given security anywhere in
this paper has no relation to its strength or weakness as an investment. Nor is
there any intention to praise or criticize. The writer is an attorney; let the
shoemaker stick to his last
'Robinson, Investment Trust Organization and Management, 1926, p. 264
et seq. Mr. Robinson refers to the Fixed Investment Trust variously as
"banker's share" companies; and "trustee certificate" companies. They are
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old idea to which resort was originally had to permit the pur-
chase of high-priced stocks by means of splitting up the ben-
eficial ownership and the sale of participating certificates in
conveniently small denominations. By this means one was
enabled to purchase indirectly as little as one one-hundredth
of a share of the stock of a company such as the Ford Motor
Company of Canada, Ltd. A similar organization of great
interest was the "London, Midland & Scottish Trust." 3 These
trusts are reported to have received considerable adverse
criticism because of improper sales methods, unwarranted
profit to the sponsors and corresponding expense to the
investor.
The transition from one stock to several was but a short
step. The resulting wide diversification and correspondingly
increased safety, as well as the introduction of fair treatment
of the investor, and the application of open business methods,
have removed most of the grounds for criticism. Naturally
every activity harbors its black sheep, but the fact remains
that at this writing no less than twenty trusts of this
type can be found listed in the "Over the Counter" section
of the Yew York Sun 4 representing an enormous public
participation.5
A fixed investment trust is normally created by the ex-
ecution of an agreement of trust to which the trustee, the de-
positor and the beneficiaries are parties,-the latter by virtue
of taking and holding the certificateg by which the beneficial
interest is represented. The depositor is the settlor of the
trust. It is a corporation formed usually with powers not dis-
similar to those of a trading corporation, for the purpose of
purchasing the securities underlying the trust and depositing
them with the trustee. The trust agreement is quite elabor-
treated in a chapter entitled "Stock Conversion Companies." Mr. Robinson
states, "In this chapter we shall study an application of certain investment trust
principles in form peculiar to the United States." The 1929 edition of Mr.
Robinson's book was published too late to be consulted.
Robinson, op. rit., p. 267.
'See The New York Sin, September 24, 1929. The list is obviously but a
partial enumeration of the trusts actually in business.
'An accurate estimate of the total investment in fixed trusts is not available.
As of October 15, 1929, North American Trust Shares had disposed of
$29,000,000 in certificates since February, 1929. Trustee Standard Oilshares, on
the same date, had outstanding over $12,000,000 in something over fourteen
months, $10,000,000 of which were sold since May, 1929.
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ate, defining all essential elements of the trust, including not
only the duties, powers and immunities of each of the parties,
but also containing carefully constructed provisions respect-
ing the trust property.
The fundamental unit of beneficial interest is called a
"trust share" 6 and is usually given a name or title, fanciful
or otherwise, by which the security becomes known and
around which the good will of the trust is constructed.7 The
trust share represents an undivided fractional interest in the
trust property. It is rarely given a nominal or par value,
although some instances have come to the attention of the
writer. The size of the fractional interest depends to a large
extent, ab initio at least, upon the price at which the security
is intended to be sold. This price is made up, in every case, by
the actual market value of the underlying securities, plus odd
lot brokerage, plus the reserve fund (if any) and accumula-
tions, plus a small charge, say five to ten per cent, for profit.
Seldom do these trusts first appear on the market at a price
in excess of ten to fifteen dollars per trust share. The shares
are represented by certificates of various denominations run-
ning from five or ten shares to as high as ten thousand. The
certificates may be either registered or in bearer form; if
the latter, they are intended to be transferable by delivery
merely, in the same manner as a negotiable instrument, and
contain elaborate contractual provisions tending to make
the instrument negotiable in fact if not in law. The certifi-
cates contain upon their face an appropriate legend, refer-
ring to the trust agreement under which they are issued, to-
gether with a summation of the more important provisions
respecting negotiation by delivery, termination of the trust,
etc. Attached to each certificate, if in bearer form, are appro-
priate coupons, calling for semi-annual payments to be made
in the manner subsequently more fully described. All in all
6 Also "trust certificates," "participation certificates," or any other appro-
priate designation.
Undoubtedly the law of unfair competition will afford protection in a
proper case to the name adopted by the trust. This field is not confined to
investment trusts and is outside the scope of this paper. As a matter of
interest, Standard Oilshares, Inc., Depositor of Trustee Standard Oilshares is
the complainant in a Delaware action now pending, seeking to restrain Standard
Oil Group, Inc. from the use of its corporate name and the name "Standard
Oil Trust Shares" as applied to a similar trust.
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such certificates are not unlike a bond in general appearance.
On the reverse of each coupon is printed an ownership certifi-
cate for purposes of Federal Income Tax.8 On the reverse of
the certificates appears a list of the underlying securities as
of a certain date, usually the date of the creation of the trust.
The process by which trust shares are created is as fol-
lows: At the time of the-execution of the agreement, the de-
positor, having made the necessary purchase, deposits with
the trustee a "stock unit," as fully described in the trust
agreement, and consisting of a certain number (say four) of
shares of each of the common stocks 9 of a number of care-
fully chosen companies. The designation of these companies,
as a practical matter, is most important. The entire success
of the trust depends upon an intelligent and industrious ex-
amination and analysis of numerous companies and the final
choice of sound and progressive concerns with an assured
dividend policy as well as a proper and satisfactory record
and growth.
In addition to the stock unit, there is also deposited with
the trustee certain cash, representing dividends, etc., payable
subsequent to the deposit to stockholders of record prior to
the deposit. In some trusts there is also deposited a given
amount of cash as a reserve fund, the purpose of which is to
stabilize distributions' 0 It is provided in the agreement that
all income received by the trustee is to be credited to "cur-
rently distributable funds"; which funds are to be paid out
entirely to the stockholders semi-annually against coupons
above mentioned, or in case of registered certificates, by check
to the registered owner. Where a reserve fund is provided,
each semi-annual coupon calls for a definite amount-say 30
per share." If currently distributable funds at a given cou-
pon date are in excess of this amount, not only is the 30 paid
but the full amount of the excess is distributed at the
' The trustee of a true trust of this type must make a fiduciary return.
The ownership certificate is to supply the necessary information respecting the
beneficiary for whose account the payment is made.
D Or, of course, an other type of security.
"Cf. North American Trust Shares and Fixed Trust Shares.
"If there is no reserve fund, the amount of the coupon cannot be definite.
In such cases it calls for the payment of the "appropriate proportionate part" of
the trust income. Cf. Trustee Standard Oilshares.
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same time, the certificate holder receiving his proportionate
share of all income received by the trustee. If, however, the
amount available for distribution is less than 30¢, the trustee
makes up the difference out of the reserve fund, so that, as
long as there are funds in the reserve, the shareholder will
receive as a minimum the amount called for on the face of his
coupon. If the reserve fund has been depleted by a given dis-
tribution, then the next time there are currently distributable
funds in excess of 300 per share, the trustee withholds 12 an
amount sufficient to replenish the reserve fund-but only out
of the excess-and distributes the balance.
Upon the deposit, as above described, of a stock unit and
cash, the trustee issues to the depositor certificates represent-
ing trust shares comprising a unit as agreed upon in the trust
agreement-say 2,000--each share thus representing an un-
divided one two-thousandth of a unit of deposited property
which would be worth, if the value of the stock unit plus the
cash was about $20,000, in the neighborhood of $10 each.
The agreement also provides that at any time and from
time to time new deposits may be made of stock units and
cash, against each of which certificates representing a similar
number of trust shares will be issued. Provision is made in
the case of the cash accompanying each deposit for the in-
clusion of all accumulations on the property already in the
trust to the end that every unit deposited will be exactly the
same as every other unit and thus every trust share will be
exactly the same as every other trust share, making one large
trust rather than a series of separate trusts, with correspond-
ing ease in marketability of the shares and in bookkeeping
mechanics. It is apparent that with this machinery there is
no limit to the size to which a trust of this type may grow.
The duration of the trust is commonly twenty years or
longer. At its termination the trustee will liquidate the de-
posited property and distribute the cash pro rata to the hold-
ers of the shares. In order that there will be no sudden flood-
ing of the securities market with large quantities of the
'To keep the question of income taxation clear the agreement provides
that the necessary amount will be paid to the Trustee or the Trustee may with-
hold it from the total payment. This makes it certain that the full amount of
the coupon payment is income to the shareholder irrespective of the amount
withheld.
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stocks held in the trust the trustee should be permitted a
reasonable time within which to liquidate--say three months
or longer. Incidentally, the writer has heard black proph-
ecies as to the dire effect of such liquidation upon the market.
Consider, they say, one hundred millions in stocks that must
be turned into cash. But a trust of one hundred millions
means, at present prices, about twenty thousand shares of a
given security. This number is but a small fraction of the
normal floating supply and should be absorbed by the market
over a period of three months with hardly noticeable effect.
Validity of Fixed Trusts in Respect of Perpetuities.
The trust as drawn in New York is created for a definite
period of years."3 The .agreement contains, however, provi-
sions by which it may be terminated prior to that time by the
trustee and, furthermore, provisions by means of which the
holders of trust shares may surrender their shares, terminate
their own interest in the trust and receive from the trustee
the value thereof.14 It is these provisions which save the
trust created in the state of New York from the operation of
the New York rule against restraints on alienation. 15 It is
provided in the Personal Property Law as follows:
"The absolute ownership of personal property
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition,
for a longer period than during the continuance and
until the termination of not more than two lives in
being at the date of the instrument conthining such
limitation or condition. * * *" 16
In jurisdictions recognizing the English view of the Rule against Per-
petuities, the period is indefinite, phrased as twenty-one years after the death
of certain named individuals.
" In case a holder of shares constituting a unit wishes to surrender, he may
receive from the trustee a unit of the deposited property in kind, together with
the cash in the reserve fund and in the currently distributable fund applicable
to such unit.
' More properly so called rather than "rule against perpetuities." It is
not truly a rule against perpetuities. See the Liberty National Bank case,
infra Note 22 at 494; Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 644
at 652, 141 Supp. 1065 (1st Dept., 1913).
"New York Personal Property Law (1917), Sec. 11.
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It is well established in New York that a trust for a fixed
period, no matter how short, violates the rule against re-
straints on alienation since the rule is based upon a life or
lives in being.17 And it is, of course, upon this ground that
any question of illegality would be raised. There is, however,
an additional provision in the statute which is as follows:
"In other respects limitations of future or contin-
gent interests in personal property are subject to the
rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real
property." 18
The Real Property Law contains the following definition
of the suspension of the power of alienation:
"The absolute power of alienation is suspended,
when there are no persons in being by whom an abso-
lute fee in possession can be conveyed" 19
A preliminary question is this-Does the provision of
the Personal Property Law incorporate the quoted provision
of the Real Property Law for this purpose? There are appar-
ently no decided cases in which this section was specifically
incorporated, but generally most of the real property rules
have been assimilated 20 and it seems to be a reasonably safe
assumption, if not certain law, that such is the case with the
provision above cited. In Williams v. Montgomery 21 it is so
'Philips v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69 (1861). it re Kalter's Will, 86 Misc. 621,
148 N. Y. Supp. 921 (1914); Davis v. MacMahon, 161 App. Div. 458, 146 N.
Y. Supp. 657 (1st Dept., 1914), aff'd 214 N. Y. 614, 108 N. E. 1092 (1915).
"Supra Note 16.
"New York Real Property Law (1917), Sec. 42.
' See National Park Bank v. Billings, 144 App. Div. 536, 129 N. Y. Supp.
846 (1st Dept., 1911), aff'd 203 N. Y. 556, 96 N. E. 1122 (1911). The cases
in which this gradual assimilation has taken place are too numerous for citation.
A few of the more important are as follows: "Vested" and "contingent future"
estates in personal property are defined as similar estates in real estate. Van-
derpool v. Burke, 63 Misc. 545, 118 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1909). The rule that
an unqualified gift of the income from real estate is in legal effect a devise of
the property itself is applicable to a similar gift of income of personal property.
Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Fifth Ave., Baptist Church. 60 App. Div. 327,
70 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dept., 1901), aff'd 172 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E. 1126 (1902).
An excellent collection of authorities may be found in McKinney's Consolidated
Laws of New York, Annotated, Personal Property Law, pp. 16, 17.
148 N. Y. 519, 526, 43 N. E. 57 (1896).
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stated and the same result has been clearly indicated in a
strong dictum by the United States District Court of Massa-
chusetts, in Liberty National Bank, etc. v. New England In-
vestors' Shares, Inc.2"
If the New York rule against restraints on alienation is
to be interpreted pursuant to the authorities above discussed
(and it is hard to avoid such conclusion), it is submitted to
be conclusive for the legality of the trust that the provisions
of the agreement permit the holders of trust shares repre-
senting a unit 23 of deposited property to terminate their in-
terest in the trust and receive the underlying securities, cash,
etc. since there are at all times persons in being entitled to
receive absolute title to the property held in trust and with it
the complete power of alienation. It should make no differ-
ence whether the power thus to terminate the entire trust is
in the hands of one person or several.24 It seems safe to assert
-25 Fed. (2d), 493, 496 (D. C. Mass., 1920). This case involved a fixed
investment trust much as above described. Since the settlor company was
incorporated in Massachusetts, the decision turned upon an interpretation of the
law of the settlor's domicile under which the trust was held valid in respect of
the rule against perpetuities. The Court added, however, a strong dictum to
the effect that even if the New York law was held to apply, the attack upon
the trust under Section 11 of the Personal Property Law would also fail. The
Court said: "* * * there were provisions, in the trust under consideration, by
which a holder or holders of 1,000 collateral trustee shares could, at any time
during the life of the trust, surrender his, or their, certificate or certificates
representing the shares and receive a unit of underlying securities in exchange
therefor. These provisions bring the case within the principle enunciated in
Hammerstein v. Equitable Trust Co., sitpra, inasmuch as at all times it was
possible for the holders of the beneficial interest to terminate the trust as to
that portion of the trust res represented by their shares and thereby acquire the
absolute ownership and power of alienation over the same. The result would
be the same whether the trust was terminated by the acts of one party or by
the joint acts of several parties." The Hammerstein case, referred to in the
foregoing quotation, was affirmed, but the point involved here was not discussed.
See 209 N. Y. 429; 103 N. E. 706 (1913). For authorities in other jurisdictions
on this saving feature see Groub v. Blish, 152 N. E. 609 (Ind. App., 1926);
Baker v. Stern, 216 N. W. 147 (Wis., 1927); Howe v. Morse, 174 Mass. 491,
55 N. E. 213 (1899).
"It need not, of course, be a unit. In the indenture by which North
American Trust Shares are created, the holders of shares representing a
quarter unit or any multiple thereof may so terminate. This agreement requires
the deposit of four shares of each stock in a unit and contains provisions which
assure that there will never be more or less than four shares of a given security,
by requiring the sale of stock dividends and split-ups of all shares received in
excess of four. Unless these latter provisions are contained in the indenture,
the portfolio soon becomes unbalanced and mechanical details for the taking
down of less than a unit are practically impossible.
" See Williams v. Montgomery, supra Note 21; Stoiber v. Stoiber, 40 App.
Div. 156, 160; 57 N. Y. Supp. 916 (2nd Dept., 1899).
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that such trusts are valid under the New York Law. To make
assurance doubly sure a number of trusts have provisions in
the agreement enabling the holder of any number of shares,
no matter how few, to surrender their certificates and receive
the cash value of their shares. This is made practical by the
depositor maintaining with the trustee a sort of revolving
fund. An amount of money approximating the value of a
unit is set aside and expended in taking up small sharehold-
ings when presented. When a unit has so been purchased, the
shares are turned in and a unit property is taken out of the
trust and sold, the proceeds being used to replenish the re-
volving fund.
Income Taxation of Fixed Trusts Under the Federal Statutes
Section 701 (2) of the Revenue Act of 1928 reads as
follows:
"The term 'corporation' includes associations,
joint stock companies and insurance companies."
Prior revenue acts contained identical language.25 Under
this statutory definition an important question arises as to
the taxation of a fixed investment trust operating along the
lines hereinbefore discussed-Is the income received by the
trustee 26 upon the underlying securities and other property,
to be distributed by it to the holders of the trust shares, tax-
able at the rate prescribed for corporations and payable only
by the trustee as an "association," or is it to be treated as a
true or "pure" trust, and the tax paid by the beneficiary who
ultimately receives the income? 27
In order to approach this question properly, attention
must be called to the type of organization commonly referred
'Section 2 (2) of the Revenue Acts of 1926, 1924, 1921, 1918, 1917.
0 The indenture provides that the trustee shall have legal title to the
deposited property and that securities shall be held in its name or in the name
of its nominees. Dividends, etc., on the deposited stocks are paid to the holders
of the securities.
IT In general, the beneficiaries return, and are taxed on, income which is
distributed; the trustee returns, and is taxed on, income which is accumulated.
Art. 861 of Regulations 74.
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to as a "Massachusetts Trust,"-usually a collection of capi-
tal under a deed of trust in which the trustee administers the
property for the benefit of numerous beneficiaries whose
equitable interest is represented by transferable participat-
ing shares much the same as certificates of stock.28 Indeed
the declarations of trust by which these organizations are
created are artfully designed to bring about nearly all cor-
porate advantages without actual incorporation. 29 The true
nature of these organizations has been the core of much liti-
gation since their introduction in Massachusetts from Eng-
land in the early nineteenth century, but gradually a classi-
fication has been developed which has resulted in their being
either (1) trusteeships or pure trusts on one hand, or (2)
partnerships on the other-and into which class a given or-
ganization will fall is determined simply by the amount of
control retained by or given to the beneficiaries.30 No author-
ity has been found in this connection, i.e., the classification
into trusts or partnerships-where the question presented
was income tax liability.
The Treasury Department was thus faced with an organ-
ization, often very large both as to capital and as to number
of beneficiaries, which, under the law of the state in which it
was organized, would be held either a trust or a partnership.
Whether it be treated as the one or the other, the Government
would receive a tax based upon the rates for individuals,
which have always been lower than those placed upon corpor-
ations. Furthermore, corporations were not permitted many
of the deductions and other advantages extended to inivid-
' There is no reason why the "Massachusetts Trust" structure could not be
used for a managerial or speculative type of investment trust. Indeed it would
seem that the original importation from England of this type of organization
was in just this form. In New York the development is along corporate lines.
See supra p. 2.
'Warren, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation, 383 et seq. See
the Declaration of Trust of the Boston Personal Property Trust printed in
Warren, op. cit. 880. The Mackay Companies, operating the Postal Telegraph
and Commercial Cables is another outstanding example of this type of
organization.
'8 Thompson, Corporations (3rd ed.), Sec. 6737. This is the test adopted
in Massachusetts. See Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355 (1913)
(the leading case in that state), and Bourchard v. First Peoples Trust, 253
Mass. 351, 148 N. E. 895 (1925).
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uals. They are subject to a tax on the issue of their stock 31
and at one time they were taxed upon dividends received from
other corporations. 2
Adopting the policy of collecting the most possible tax
and letting the taxpayer fight out the question of a refund in
the courts, the Treasury Department proceeded to impose a
tax upon these organizations as associations under the statu-
tory definition above set out. A favorable opportunity pre-
sented itself in the case of a Maine corporation which had
transferred to trustees, stock held by it in a paper manu-
facturing corporation in Massachusetts, together with cer-
tain real property held by the Massachusetts corporation as
lessee. This transfer was made under a declaration of trust
which gave wide powers to the trustees, reserving to the
beneficiaries (the interests of whom were represented by
transferable shares) only the power to consent as a condition
to the increase of the compensation of the trustees, the filling
of any vacancies among trustees, or modifying the terms of
the trust. Under the Revenue Act of 1913, the Treasury De-
partment held this organization to be an association and as-
sessed and levied a tax against the trustees upon dividends
received by them. The trustees took the position that they
were strictly trustees and entitled to exemption as individ-
uals.33 Suit was instituted and eventually the now famous
decision of Crocker v. Malley 34 was handed down by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. The court practically con-
ceded that the organization would be held a true trust under
the laws of Massachusetts 35 and proceeded to determine
whether a different view was required by the Revenue Act
under consideration. The court held the organization not
taxable as an association.
U. S. Code. Sec. 901. The tax on the issuance of capital stock is shown
in par. 2 of Schedule A annexed to said section.
"Under the Revenue Acts of 1913 and 1916. To-day dividends received
by a corporation are permitted as a deduction from gross income. See Revenue
Act of 1928, Sec. 23 (p.).
'See Revenue Act, 1913, Sec. 11 (d).
*'249 U. S. 223, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 270 (1918).
3Ibid. 232, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 271: "There can be little doubt that in
Massachusetts this arrangement would be held to create a trust and nothing
more."
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Students of tax avoidance were thus presented with a
decision of the United States Supreme Court on a question
of Federal taxation, to the effect that a true trust (being such
under the law of the place of its organization by virtue of al-
most complete lack of control in the beneficiaries) was not an
"association" under the Revenue Act. This, coupled with the
fact that the doctrine of the Crocker case was applied lit-
erally by the Treasury Department, resulted in a mushroom
growth of organizations of the Massachusetts Trust type,
with carefully drawn declarations of trust to exclude control
by the beneficiaries to assure that under the state law appli-
cable, they would be held pure trusts. This was a favored
method of tax avoidance.
3 6
Although nearly all of the Massachusetts Trusts were
engaged in some kind of business enterprise, it will be noted
that the trustees in the Crocker case did not "carry on busi-
ness." 3 This differentiation between the character of the
trust in the Crocker case and in large numbers of organiza-
tions seeking to come within its rule was soon the basis for a
second attempt on the part of the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue successfully to tax these large aggregations of capital,
carrying on business in much the same manner as corpora-
tions.3 8 The renewed effort on the part of the Treasury De-
partment resulted in the decision by the Supreme Court of
'Not, it will be noticed, tax evasion. It is apprehended that no policy of
the law compels one to conduct his affairs so as to pay the most possible tax.
While the law should frown upon an attempt to evade taxes properly due, one
is entitled, legally and equitably, to avoid payment of unnecessary taxes. The
only question presented is whether the means used are legally effective to
accomplish the result. See Bowers v. New York Trust Company, 9 F. (2d)
548, (C. C. A., 2nd, 1925) for an excellent example of avoidance as distinguished
from evasion. Generally on the subject see U. S. v. Isham, 17 Wall (U. S.) 496,
506 (1873); Weeks v. Sibley, 269 Fed. 155 (D. C. Tex., 1920); Draper v.
Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53 (1877) and cf. Morris v. Gelmer, 129 U. S. 315, 9 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 289 (1889) ; Young v. Pollak, 85 Ala. 439, 5 So. 279 (1888).
In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes, they did not "manage the mills."
Supra Note 34 at 232, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 271.
Nearly every advantage of corporate organization can be obtained by a
careful preparation of the Declaration of Trust. It may obtain succession of
members, ownership of property, concentration of powers of management, suits
by or against the entity, elimination of liability of shareholders and trustees,-
as to the latter at least to the extent of claims based on contract. The small
risk as to liability for tort claims is the only situation where complete analogy
to corporate organization cannot positively be obtained. Warren, op. cit., supra
Note 29 at 383 et seq.
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the United States in Hecht v. Malley 3 9 The Hecht case con-
sisted of three actions for the refund of excise taxes assessed
under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918 against three differ-
ent "Massachusetts Trusts,"-the Hecht Real Estate Trust,
the Haymarket Trust and the Crocker Trust. The Hecht
trust ran an office building, the Haymarket trust ran a store
and office building, and the Crocker trust ran cotton mills. 40
In the case of each organization, it was held that an associa-
tion had been created, taxable as if a corporation, the Court
saying: 41
"We think that the word 'association' as used in
the Act clearly includes 'Massachusetts Trusts' such
as those herein involved, having quasi-corporate or-
ganizations under which they are engaged in carrying
on business enterprises. 42 What other form of 'asso-
ciation,' if any, it includes, we need not, and do not,
determine."
The Crocker case was distinguished and confined to its
specific result, namely, that the Income Tax Act of 1913 did
not show an intention to impose upon trustees, as an associa-
tion, double liability as to dividends on stock of a corpora-
tion that itself paid a tax.43 The Court added:
* * * And the language used arguendo in reach-
ing this conclusion that the trustees could not be
deemed an association unless all trustees with dis-
cretionary powers are such, and that there was no
ground for grouping together the beneficiaries and
trustees in order to turn them into an association-is
to be read in the light of the trust agreement there in-
'265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. 462, 68 L. ed. 949 (1924).
to The Crocker Trust conceded its classification as an association. Ibid.
157, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 466.
" Ibid. 157, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 466.
The Court subtends a footnote at this point as follows: "In the present
cases the Circuit Court of Appeals said: 'It is a matter of common knowledge
that, for most business and financial purposes, all the larger organizations of
this sort have for years been indistinguishable from corporations. * * *' 281
Fed. at p. 370."
3Supra Note 39 at 160, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 468.
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volved, under which the trustees were, in substance,
merely holding property for the collection of the
income and its distribution among the beneficiaries,
and were not engaged, either by themselves or in
connection with the beneficiaries, in carrying on any
business." 44
Before proceeding, certain features of these decisions
should be emphasized. Crocker v. Malley, although including
in its reasoning the thought that to call the trust there in-
volved an association would be "an unnatural perversion of
a well-known institution of the law," 45 a perversion, in other
words, of the institution recognized by the law as a trust,
only decided that if double taxation results, and it is not clear
that such result was intended, then an organization will not
be taxed as an association.46 The Hecht case involved no
question of double taxation, since all that was to be deter-
mined was whether the trusts there involved should pay an
excise tax. Either that tax was to be paid or there would be
no tax. Further, the Court did not stop to decide whether or
not these trusts were true trusts or partnerships. In either
case, they would be associations under the applicable Rev-
enue Act.
This last position of the Court was challenged in a later
case-Burk-Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins.47 There
the plaintiff was organized to carry on business in the State
of Texas. It was founded upon an agreement called "articles
of association" and its capital was divided into transferable
shares. There was, however, considerable control left to the
shareholders, making it certain that, under the Texas law,
the organization would clearly be considered a partnership.48
Here, for the first time since Crocker v. Malley, the Supreme
Court of the United States passed upon the question of "asso-
"Ibid. 161, 44 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 468.
"Supra Note 34 at 234, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 272.
40The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes contains the following sentence:
"Upon the whole case we are of opinion that the statute fails to show a clear
intent to subject the dividends on the Massachusetts corporation's stock to the
extra tax imposed by G (a)."
'269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48, 70 L. ed. 183 (1925).
" Cf. Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554 (1925).
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ciation" in respect of income taxation 49 in a situation where
(unlike the Hecht case) there were provisions for income
taxation ready to be applied regardless of which classifica-
tion was adopted for the organization. The direct question
was whether the tax was properly imposed upon the organ-
ization as an "association," and, therefore, as if it were a
corporation.
The argument made by the plaintiff was not unlike that
in Crocker v. Malley-double taxation. Further, although
the Act referred generally to associations, it also referred,
and referred specifically, to partnerships. Admitting that
had only an "association" been taxed that plaintiff would be
held such, nevertheless there was also specific reference to a
partnership, into which classification plaintiff fell by the law
of the state in which it was organized and in which it con-
ducted all of its business. If it was a partnership in that
state (claimed the plaintiff), then the question was settled-
it was a partnership for all purposes, including Federal in-
come tax. To all of which the Court answered as follows:
"The term partnership as used in these sections
obviously refers only to ordinary partnerships. Un-
incorporated joint stock associations, although tech-
nically partnerships under the law of many states, are
not in common parlance referred to as such." GO
Crocker v. Malley was not cited.
Here, then, we have a holding that irrespective of whether
a given organization is a partnership under the law of the
state of its organization, it may, nevertheless, be an associa-
tion for the purpose of taxation under the various Revenue
Acts, and, further, that the definition of association to in-
clude a corporation applies to all sections of the entire Rev-
enue Act, whether they cover excise tax, income tax or
what not.
This decision, it will be noted, fixes the law as to part-
nerships. How then as to those organizations which are un-
"Had the excise tax been involved it would seem that Hecht v. Malley
would be conclusive on the question in favor of the government.
0 Supra Note 47 at 113, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. at 49.
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doubtedly trusts? It would seem to follow, by close analogy,
that the same result would be reached,-admitting the organ-
ization to be a trust according to the law of the state where
organized and where the business is conducted, nevertheless
it may be an association under the Revenue Act.
The District Court of the United States for the District
of Massachusetts has had this specific question before it twice
since the Burk-Waggoner case was decided. In Hornblower
v. White 51 a corporation, formed for the purpose of develop-
ing and irrigating land in Colorado, was in financial difficul-
ties. The "Costilla Trust" was formed, to raise money for the
payment of taxes and ultimately winding up its affairs. The
trustees were to hold, control and manage the securities of
the corporation "with full general powers, inter alia, to vote
the shares and continue or discontinue the corporation, to
foreclose or not, and generally to exercise their best judgment
and discretion in taking such steps and measures as will in-
sure the most prompt and efficient realization upon the val-
ues in the Costilla property, and a winding up of its affairs
and the affairs of the Trust." 52 Certificates for shares repre-
senting the beneficial interests were issued. The question was
soon presented whether the organization was subject to the
stamp tax imposed by the Revenue Act of 1918 and the Rev-
enue Act of 1921 on the issue of stock by a corporation. It
was held that the organization was not an association and
not subject to the tax in question, and this squarely upon the
ground that, under the laws of Massachusetts, a pure trust
had been formed.13 Although decided long after the Burk-
Waggoner case, that decision was not cited. Hecht v. Malley
was cited but distinguished solely on the ground that in each
of the trusts there involved, the beneficiaries had the supreme
control-a factor which was not present in the case then
at bar.
The Hornblower case was appealed, but pending that ap-
peal the question was again presented to the same court in
'21 F. (2d) 82 (D. C. Mass., 1927).
' This extract was taken from a circular sent to the stockholders of the
corporation stating the purpose of the proposed trust.
'The Court said (supra Note 51 at 82) "Its organization was similar to
that of the Wachusetts Real Estate Trust * ** involved in the case of Crocker
v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223, which seems decisive of the case at bar."
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Neal v. United States.54 The organization there involved was
also a true trust under the Massachusetts law, but the ques-
tion involved the imposition of the capital stock tax. The
trust had been organized to undertake and carry on "any-
where, any business, transaction or operation which an in-
dividual could legally undertake and carry on." District
Judge Brewster was content to follow Judge Lowell in the
Eornblower case. The Burk-Waggoner Oil case was cited
but, together with Hedht v. Malley, was distinguished upon
the ground that the organizations, in their nature, were dif-
ferent from the trust then under consideration.
As stated above the Hornblower case was appealed. The
decision on the appeal 15 was one of affirmance-but the af-
firmance was only as to the result,7-the Court pointing out
that the taxability of the organization as an association no
longer depends upon whether it is a strict trust under the law
of the state where created. The Court said:
"The measure of control over the trust vested in
the beneficiaries, does not seem to be the determining
factor, but rather whether the trustees are conducting
a business for profit or gain. * * * The powers of the
certificate holders and the effect of the trust deed--i.e.,
whether it constitutes a partnership or a strict trust
-are significant only as they tend to show whether
what the interested parties did amounted to forming
themselves into an association for carrying on a busi-
ness enterprise in quasi-corporate form for profit or
gain." 56
With this definition before them--"carrying on a busi-
ness enterprise in quasi-corporate form for profit or gain"-
the Court proceeded to an examination of the trust and,
reaching the conclusion that the activities of the trustees
were only such as naturally followed from ownership of the
securities which they held, decided that the organization was
' 26 F. (2d) 708 (D. C. Mass., 1928).
' See 27 F. (2d) 777 (C. C. A., 1st, 1928), sub. norn. White v. Hornblower.
' Ibid. 778.
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not carrying on a business and, therefore, in spite of its
quasi-corporate form, was not taxable as an association. 57
The decisions above discussed seem to be reducible to
the following principles:
(1) An organization in trust form with quasi-corporate
characteristics but which does not carry on a business, is not
an association under the various Revenue acts. Crocker v.
Malley, supra.
(2) Such an organization which does carry on business
is an association. Hecht v. Malley, supra.
(3) An organization carrying on a business in quasi-
corporate form is an association regardless of whether it is a
partnership or a trust under the state law. Burk-Waggoner
Oil Association v. Hopkins, supra (partnership), and White
v. Hornblower, supra (trust) .8
In order to make complete the r~sum6 of the authorities
respecting this matter, some mention should be made of the
rulings within the department. A full discussion is outside
the scope of this article, and, covering the authorities to the
date of publication, has appeared in most satisfactory form
elsewhere5 9 It is a fair summary to say that the decisions and
rulings followed closely the lines laid down in the cases above
discussed and have emphasized the question: Is the organiza-
tion conducting business in a quasi-corporate form? If the
answer is "Yes," it is held to be an association; if "No," then
' The Neal case has also been appealed. In the opinion of the writer it
will be reversed, since the trust was empowered to carry on a business. See
text following the reference to this footnote. [N. B.: Since the foregoing was
written, by a per curiam decision, and resting solely on the Hornblower dase,
supra, Neal v. United States was reversed. 28 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A., 1st,
1928).]
' The writer has not overlooked the fact that the decided cases relating to
the determination of what constitutes an association have come up under varying
types of taxes: capital stock tax, stock issue tax, income tax, etc. In answer to
the possible argument that each case should not be extended beyond its actual
holding, there is undoubtedly an indication in the Burk-Waggoner case that
the Court will apply its rulings in this connection to all types of taxation. The
Department has done this very thing. See Article 1314 of Regulations 74.
r' See a booklet entitled Some Legal Questions in Relation to Investment
Trusts, by Leonard M. Wallstein of the New York Bar, published in 1928 by
The Corporation Trust Company.
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it is taxed as a trust. And it seems settled that both of these
elements must be present"
There seems to be a great scarcity, both in the Depart-
ment and in the courts, of authorities which deal with the
taxation of either the fixed or managerial type of investment
trust. General Counsel's Memorandum #1881,11 involved a
trust indenture under which the trustee was given power not
only to direct and supervise investments, but also to sell and
purchase any security held as part of the trust property. It
was, therefore, truly a "management" or "speculative" trust
-a trust organized for the purpose of deriving profit from
the purchase and sale of securities rather than from cautious
investment,--it was a trust organized to speculate and trade.
Clearly such activities constitute carrying on a business and
it is equally clear that the opinion of the General Counsel,
taxing the organization as an association, was sound. The
trust was organized as a typical "Massachusetts Trust" or-
ganization-a board of trustees, similar to the directors of a
corporation and shares transferable on the books of the com-
pany, similar to corporate stock.
A second authority appears as a result of a request to the
Department for a ruling by a trust which was organized sim-
ilar to the typical fixed trust as described early in the paper.
This ruling is signed by the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, and is dated January 15, 1929, bears the symbols
GC :I:I :JA, and the number "A-230362." 62 Here the organ-
ization deposited units of property against which certificates
were issued by the trustee representing beneficial ownership,
and generally was built upon the accepted lines of the fixed
trust. There were provisions in the trust indenture which
permitted sale of the trust property under six different con-
ditions-(1) if a deposited stock was split or divided,6 3 (2)
' See G. C. M. 4120, VII-36 Cum. Bull. 3883, where the organization
admittedly carried on a business enterprise (development of real estate sub-
division) but was held taxable as a trust and not an association since, generally
speaking, it was not organized in quasi-corporate form. And see G. C. M. 3412,
VII-17 Cum. Bull. 3691 where, although in quasi-corporate form, the activi-
ties of the organization were said not to be a business enterprise. Here, too, a
tax as a true trust was imposed.
'VII-1 Cum. Bull. 42.
' This ruling is in the form of a letter to the attorney for the organization
to which the writer has been given access.
'For a discussion of this element see infra p. 26.
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if a corporation, the stock of which was part of a unit, merged
with another corporation, or reorganized, 64 (3) if such cor-
poration should liquidate, or if a receiver should be appointed
and the receivership continue for sixty days, 65 (4) if such
corporation failed to pay dividends for one year,66 (5) if the
depositor believed that dividends would cease to be paid or
if it thought any stock would become substantially impaired
in value. (6) If any stock had a market value in excess of
its average cost to the depositor.
The indenture also provided that the proceeds resulting
from the sale might be reinvested by the depositor in similar
property, or else distributed as the depositor directs.
Consider the result of the above powers of sale coupled
with the power to reinvest. Particularly consider provisions
5 and 6 in this connection. If the depositor thought the stock
was too high, or if there was a profit, then there could be a
sale and a reinvestment. Clearly, it is submitted, the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue was correct in rendering his
opinion that the organization carried on the business of buy-
ing and selling securities for a profit, and, since it was organ-
ized in quasi-corporate form, it was, therefore, an association
and taxable as if a corporation. Indeed, it is difficult for the
writer to distinguish, in substance, this trust from the ordi-
nary management trust with power to speculate. Probably
the powers are equally wide with the possible exception of the
ability to "sell short." The argument advanced by the organ-
ization that the sales and reinvestments were made for the
sole purpose of protecting, safeguarding or improving the in-
tegrity of the original investment is not convincing. The fact
remains that there was power to sell securities for the sole
purpose of realizing a profit and also the power to reinvest,
which, in its essentials, is the power to trade.6 7 A trust with
The right to sell the stock under these circumstances seems unusual in a
trust of this type.
.Again the right to sell is uncommon. Usually, if not sold before the
cessation of dividends, the proceeds are distributed to the certificate holders on
the next distribution date.
' This is a usual provision, although perhaps the period is normally shorter.
This arbitrary elimination of a stock which fails to produce a return seems
desirable. See infra p. 25.
' It should be mentioned that the test is not what the organization does,
but what it has power to do. See G. C. M. 5504, VIII-2 Curm Bull. 4061,
where an organization, upon being held an association, had ceased to do the
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such wide powers of sale of .property and reinvestment of
proceeds seems properly held a business enterprise and tax-
able as an association if conducted in quasi-corporate form.
It might well be argued that such an organization is not
quasi-corporate in character and should not, therefore, be
taxed as an association, even though carrying on a business
enterprise, since both elements must be present.68 There is
but one trustee, and nothing corresponding to the board of
directors of a corporation.6 9 In addition there is nothing
corresponding to the meetings of a Board of Directors or
stockholders, and, in the writer's opinion, the action of the
individuals-stockholders and directors-back of the corpor-
ate entity in meeting assembled is one of the most significant
characteristics of the corporate form. Further, there is the
question of dividends. Corporate stockholders, even holders
of a preferred stock carrying cumulative dividends, are en-
titled to dividends only when and as declared by the Board
of Directors out of the surplus of the corporation. The inden-
ture of a fixed investment trust, on the other hand, can and
often does 70 provide for payments to the holders of the ben-
eficial interests at fixed dates, irrespective of the wishes of
the trustee and, what is more important, whether the pay-
ment constitutes a return of capital or not.71 Unless the De-
partment takes the position (as it may well do, pending a
court decision on the question) that merely the division of
the beneficial interest into transferable shares constitutes
"quasi-corporate form," this line of argument might well be a
fruitful line to follow.
Passing now to the question of the powers of the organ-
ization,-how far may the provisions of the trust indenture
things indicated by the Department as constituting a business. When the tax
was again imposed and protested the ruling held it to have been proper since
the trust still retained the power to conduct a business enterprise, even if that
power was not exercised. It appeared that the trust under consideration above
had in fact exercised its powers of sale and reinvestment a number of times
and that substantial profits had been realized.
See Note 60, supra.
But see G. C. M. 2405, VI-2 Cum. Bull. 10, holding that the fact of
but one trustee does not prevent the organization from being an association.
10 See, for instance, the trust indenture creating North American Trust
Shares, on file at the office of Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Trustee.
'As in the case of a deficiency, payment out of the reserve to meet a
coupon. See supra p. 6.
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go in the direction of administration of the trust property
and still fall short of the line between an association and a
true trust? How far, in other words, may the property of the
trust be "managed" and not constitute the carrying on of a
"business enterprise"?
It is, of course, essential to permit of some circumstances
under which trust property may be sold. For instance, rights
are often issued by corporations to stockholders, enabling
them to purchase additional stock, convertible bonds or other
securities of the corporation at a price less than the market
value. Such rights are valuable assets of the trust, but, if that
value is to be preserved to the 'beneficiaries, they must either
be exercised or sold prior to expiration. These trusts nor-
mally have no funds available, nor is there provision whereby
such funds can be made available, for this purpose.72 The
alternative is that the rights be sold. Such is the common
sense solution. The sale is not for the purpose of realizing a
profit. It is not an instance of the purchase and sale of securi-
ties for profit. It is not carrying on a business, and, it is sub-
mitted, even if such sale is a sale of the corpus of the trust,
it is not, without more, a basis for calling the organization
an association.
Another example of the necessity for sale is when a cor-
poration, the stock of which is part of a stock unit, declares a
dividend in kind. It would be impossible to distribute the
property thus received to the numerous beneficiaries. Here
again common sense requires such property so received to be
sold and the proceeds distributed to the beneficiaries. 73
" Funds could, of course, be made available for this purpose. The amount
required in a given period would be uncertain, however, and proper machinery
difficult, at first blush, to devise.
' Attention should be called to G. C. M. 3412, VII-1 Cum. Bull. 1349,
where a trust holding the fee to lease oil lands and which merely received and
paid over to beneficiaries the rents and royalties, was held a true trust. The
opinion, however, was qualified by predicating the conclusion on the assumption
that the rents and royalties were received by the trustee in cash, and adding that
if it should appear that payment was made in the products which were the
subject of the lease and if the trustee in selling them was engaged in carrying
on a business, the trust would be taxed as an association. This may be the law
if the payment in property and the sale of that property was the regular and
customary way in which the terms of the lease were performed. Under such
circumstances the regular sale of the products might well be deemed a business.
But a dividend in kind would be an extremely rare thing, and the occasional
sale would lack the continuity which would seem requisite in the idea of carrying
on a business.
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A very common provision in indentures creating fixed
trusts requires any security in the portfolio to be sold upon
failure to pay a regular dividend, and the continuation of a
non-dividend paying policy over a certain period of time.
Under such circumstances the security has shown itself un-
worthy of a place as a true investment and should arbitrarily
be eliminated. But this feature should not be a basis for the
claim that the trust carried on the business of trading in
securities for profit. The stock must be sold, there is no dis-
cretion in the matter. It is as nearly automatic as practical.
So much for the common provisions, none of which seems
sufficient, even when combined with all the others, for the
claim that a business enterprise, and, therefore, an associa-
tion, exists. Sales of corpus under strictly limited circum-
stances, for a purpose other than the realization of profit,
should not be the basis for taxing the organization as a
corporation.
An additional problem along these lines has been pre-
sented. No matter how strict the trust instrument is made in
an effort to make the organization truly a "fixed trust" there
are always circumstances beyond the control of anyone con-
nected with the trust, which may lead to a change in the
amount or character of the indulging securities. For instance,
stock dividends often are declared, which result in an in-
crease in the number of shares of that stock in the portfolio.
A stock might be "split," which would have the same effect.
A consolidation or a merger might occur, resulting in the
elimination of a security or a substitution of a new security.
Some of the indentures under which fixed investment
trusts are created pay no attention to these situations-
merely providing that such stock dividends be taken into the
trust, or, in the case of "split-ups" or exchanges, the new
security be taken in the place of the old.74 Under such cir-
cumstances nothing whatever occurs to question the pure
trust status of the organization. There is, however, a prac-
tical objection to permitting such additions or exchanges.
Great pains are originally taken in obtaining proper diversi-
fication of the unit investment at the time the trust is created.
I See, for instance, the Indenture by which "Trustee Standard Oilshares"
were created, on file at the Empire Trust Company, Trustee, New York City.
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If stock dividends and splits are retained in the trust, too
great a concentration appears in the securities thus affected,
and the carefully constructed diversification becomes un-
balanced.75 A carefully drawn trust agreement will guard
against such unbalancing by inserting provisions to assure
that a certain number of shares of each security will be in
the trust at all times-never more and never less. This is
done by requiring that when the trustee receives shares in
excess of the number originally in the trust by virtue of a
stock dividend, or by virtue of a "split-up" of stock held, or
by virtue of an exchange, the original number of shares shall
be retained and the excess sold. 76 Care must be taken to pro-
vide that the proceeds of such sale are to be distributed to the
holders of certificates at the next ensuing distribution date
and not to be reinvested by the trust.7 7 Should such reinvest-
ment be permitted the trust may well be said to carry on a
business, although even here, as in the case of the sale for the
purpose of eliminating a non-dividend paying security, the
sale is mandatory and not made for the purpose of realizing
a profit, and is made pursuant to explicit directions in the
trust agreement and without the exercise of discretion.
'As a practical matter such lack of balance not only decreases the safety
of the security in the eyes of the investing public, but an affirmative result may
well be evidenced, in that Blue Sky Commissions might interfere. The writer
has been reliably informed that the California Blue Sky Law administrators
will not qualify an investment trust more than five per cent. of which is
invested in one security. The accuracy of this statement has not been checked.
To demonstrate this "unbalancing" of the portfolio, the sponsors of North
American Trust Shares claim that if that trust had been established in 1922,
comprising four shares each of 28 stocks, with an approximately even distribu-
tion of investment over the group, today there would be 21% in one security
and 52% in six securities.
" Sometimes an exchange would result in the trust owning less than the
original number of shares of a given security per unit. Cf. an exchange of one
share of new stock for four shares of old; an exchange of two shares of a new
corporation for five shares of the old corporation. If a trust wishes to keep
the number of shares of each security divisible by four-as is the case of a trust
permitting the holders of a quarter-unit to terminate and receive the underlying
securities applicable to a quarter unit-the agreement should compel a sale if
the number of shares is ever below four.
" The result is economically sound. The shareholder realizes on a certain
portion of the appreciation of the underlying securities. Since cash returns on
important stocks are 3% or less, appreciation must be utilized by the person
requiring a 6% return for normal living expenses. If this policy is not approved
by the individual who wants his appreciation to remain in the trust, let him
reinvest this portion of his coupon return in additional shares, in this manner
diversifying such appreciation over all of the underlying securities. North
American Trust Shares permits this to be done without profit to the sponsors.
The new shares may be purchased without the "spread."
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The provisions respecting sale of corpus in the case of a
passed dividend, in the case of rights, and in the case of a
split-up or exchange and, in each instance, requiring a return
of the proceeds to the holders of certificates, were recently
before the Commissioner in a request for a ruling on the part
of a large trust. It was ruled that the organization in ques-
tion was not an association but "for income tax purposes a
trust within the meaning of the several Revenue Acts, and
should file returns accordingly." 78
Summary of Income Taxation of Fixed Trusts.
If the trust is not to be classified as an association under
the Revenue Acts and not to be taxed as a corporation, care
must be taken that the beneficiaries, or holders of the trust
shares, have no control over the trust. They should be lim-
ited under the trust agreement to the right to receive dis-
tributions of income and corpus and, at the termination of
the trust, their proportionate share of the trust property,
either in cash or in kind. They may consent to a modification
of the trust agreement but should not be empowered to mod-
ify it themselves. They should not be permitted to choose or
remove the trustee and should be expressly denied the right
to vote or consent with respect to any of the deposited securi-
ties. There should be no provisions for meetings of the ben-
eficiaries or any action to be taken or consent to be given by
them individually or as a body, nor should the trust shares
carry any voting rights whatever. To aid in the interpreta-
tion of the agreement it should expressly provide that the
contention of the parties is to form a true trust and no other
type of legal relation.7 9
In spite of the attitude of the department taken in re-
spect of a certain similar trust s the writer will not admit
that the organization, properly safeguarded, takes quasi-
corporate form. If the trust agreement limits the trustee to
' See a letter to Hughes, Schurman & Dwight dated June 18, 1929, from
the Commissioner. It bears the symbols IT-E-RR-WTL.
' Such a provision is not, of course, controlling. But its insertion can do
no harm and such evidence as to intention of the parties to an agreement must
have some psychological probative value.
" Supra Note 62.
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holding the property, collecting and distributing the income
derived, and to selling, under narrow circumstances, clearly
defined, certain of the trust property in unusual contingen-
cies and distributing the proceeds without the exercise of
discretion, it is hard to say that the form, under which the
trust is conducted, is anything approaching a corporation.
Compare these narrow powers of the trustee with those of a
Board of Directors. There is no power to "manage the af-
fairs" of the trust similar to the management of the affairs of
a corporation by its Board of Directors. The trustee has no
control over the amount of the distribution; the full income
must be paid out regardless of the wishes of the trustee or
anyone else. Stockholders, on the other hand, are entitled to
dividends only out of surplus or earnings and then only when
and to the extent that the directors see fit to declare them,
which the Board may or may not do, irrespective of the
amount or existence of income of the corporation, or of
whether the stock is or is not "preferred." Unlike a Board
of Directors of a corporation, the trustee of a fixed trust may
not create a surplus, incur obligations binding the trust prop-
erty (except contracts of sale when sale is required), or
change any security in which the trust property is invested.
There are no officers, no "Board," no meetings, no votes in
the beneficiaries and no removal or selection of a trustee by
them. Furthermore, while there are few, if any, points of
resemblance in the organization of a fixed trust to that of a
corporation,"' it is exactly similar to the structure of an
ordinary trust wherein the trustee is empowered to hold prop-
erty and is required to pay out the entire income periodically,
irrespective of the wishes of the trustee. It is, it would seem,
difficult to escape the conclusion that a fixed trust as ordi-
narily constituted is not organized in "quasi-corporate form."
But even if the trust is "quasi-corporate" in structure,
still it is not an association if it does not carry on a business
enterprise, and a business enterprise is not conducted unless
the trust property may freely be sold and the proceeds of the
sale reinvested in other securities. A truly fixed trust does
not permit such sale and substitution, otherwise it would not
' The only real basis of resemblance is the aggregation of capital with
participating interests represented by "shares."
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be "fixed." Necessarily certain powers of sale of the corpus
of the trust must be given, but if these are carefully limited
by the trust agreement and discretion as to time, place and
manner of the sale strictly curtailed, and if the proceeds must
be distributed to the beneficiaries, the trust will not be carry-
ing on a business enterprise, will not be subject to classifica-
tion under the Revenue Act as an association, and will not be
required to pay the corporate income tax. The trustee of a
fixed trust must hold the property. It must collect the in-
come. It must distribute the income. At the termination of
the trust and occasionally during its life it must liquidate its
holdings and distribute the proceeds in cash or in kind.
Every trustee has at least these powers, and the exercise of
them does not, it is submitted, constitute management of a
business enterprise.
Fixed Trusts and Inheritance Taxation.
During recent years a great deal of attention has been
focused upon the practical features of inheritance taxation.
Various tax experts have instituted campaigns and publicity
drives calling attention to the various inheritance tax laws
of the several states and, by emphasizing the numerous stat-
utes taxing non-residents upon property owned within the
state, exhorting investments to be scrutinized with a view to
minimizing the tribute to states other than of the decedent's
residence. Numerous states, taxing non-residents on prop-
erty owned within the state, include in such property stock
of a domestic corporation. Thus a resident of New York own-
ing stock in a Utah corporation must pay a tax to the latter
state based upon the value of his shares before the certificate
may legally be transferred. Numerous booklets and adver-
tisements have warned the investor that his estate conceiv-
ably can be taxed in twenty-three or more states and have
pointed that by a judicious selection of equally good invest-
ments chosen with an eye to the state of incorporation (un-
der, of course, the watchful guidance of the tax expert) large
sums of money could be saved to his descendants.
Before discussing the fixed trust in connection with a
possible savings in such multiple inheritance taxation, it is
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well to analyze the true situation. Just how much likelihood
is there of actually decreasing the total amount of inheri-
tance taxes?
First of all let it be known that nine states impose no
inheritance tax on intangible personal property owned by
non-resident defendants. Stock in corporations organized in
these states is, therefore, not taxed, and since the list includes
two of the favorite states of incorporation 82 a vast number
of securities are immediately freed from condemnation.
Next we must note that three states-Alabama, Florida
and Nevada-as well as the District of Columbia, have no
inheritance tax at all,-either on residents or non-residents.
Thirdly, a large group of the more important commercial
states have adopted a so-called "reciprocity" provision, the
substance of which is that if the state of the domicil of the
decedent does not impose an inheritance tax upon a domicil-
ian of the local state, the latter, in turn, will impose no tax
upon this decedent. A state belonging to this reciprocal
group thus does not tax residents of any other state in the
group. In addition, with respect to corporate stock, these
states do not tax descendants domiciled in either of the two
groups just described. At the present writing this group is
composed of no less than twenty-three states and new states
are continually joining. 3
But there is still another fact to consider, for, assuming
that the taxation imposed upon an individual, unfortunate
enough to die domiciled in one of the wayward states and
owning no property in any of the states comprising the first
two groups, could be materially cut down by judicious re-
investment, we have yet to reckon with the Federal Estate
Tax.84 The tax imposed upon all decedents by the Federal
Government, although graduated, amounts to a substantial
sum upon large estates. A provision was inserted obviously
'Delaware and New Jersey. The complete list of such states as of
October 15, 1929 is as follows: Colorado. Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia.
'The list includes the important states of California, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, New York, North Carolina and many others. Eleven were added
in 1929. South Carolina will join the reciprocal group as of January 1, 1930.
"' Revenue Act of 1926, Sec. 300 et seq. as amended by the Revenue Act
of 1928.
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intended to ease the burden of multiple taxation. It would
be permitted, it was provided, to credit against the tax pay-
able to the government the amount paid by the estate to all
states, up to 80%o of the estate tax. 5
With this added feature in mind let us see the effect upon
the efforts of a domicilian in one of the twelve states im-
posing a tax and not in the reciprocal group to decrease his
inheritance taxes. He is able, we will say, to avoid taxes to
outside states entirely. He probably will be astounded to
know that his efforts have had no effect but to increase his
Federal Estate Tax by exactly the same amount 86 The com-
plicated effect to reduce taxes has meant nothing. His execu-
tors will pour his money into one hopper instead of another.
He has, it would seem, been chasing a will-o'-the-wisp.87
After the above effort to minimize the actual importance
in dollars and cents of the multiple inheritance tax problem,
we may return to our examination of fixed trusts, for these
organizations at one time (and some of them continue) have
stressed the point that an investment in such security solves
the problem.
Consider for a moment the managerial trust, operating
in corporate form. Here the "beneficiary" is a stockholder in
a certain corporate entity. He is not concerned with the se-
curities in which the funds of his corporation are invested.
'Revenue Act of 1926, Sec. 301-b. An interesting sidelight is this: The
government reckoned without the greed of the states, a number of which,
fifteen, including New York. enacted an estate tax of their own the formula
of which is as follows: Eighty per cent. of the Federal Estate Tax less all
state taxes of every kind including the local inheritance tax. The result in the
case of these states is that the government will receive no more than one-fifth
of the amount it originally intended.
' If the state of domicil is one possessed of its. own Estate Tax (spra
Note 85) the result is similarly to increase that tax rather than the Federal Tax.
s This must be considered only as a generality. There must be instances,
conceivable at least, where the total amount of the multiple taxes paid to states
other than the state of domicil exceed 80% of the Federal Estate Tax. If
these can be reduced, the reduction to 80% will be a saving. In addition small
estates might pay multiple taxes and no Federal Estate Tax at all and any
reduction would be a saving. Nor has the writer forgotten the red tape which
must be untangled in order to obtain a transfer of stock in many states even
though no tax need be paid. Such formalities are numerous, bothersome, expen-
sive and often result in great delay. See an excellent treatment of these for-
malities in the current Inheritance Tax Service of Prentice-Hall, Inc. Could
these be avoided something would be gained, but such gain cannot be reckoned
in dollars and cents and it is on the pecuniary savings that emphasis is too
often laid.
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His estate is subject to tax 88 in the state of his domicile and
in the state in which his corporation was organized-exactly
as if he owned shares in any other corporation.
As for the transfer of the beneficial interests in fixed
trusts the answer is not so clear. A large number of these
trusts are located in New York, in which state the trust prop-
erty is located, and we should consider first of all whether
there is a tax on the transfer imposed in New York.
The Tax Law contains a provision which imposes a tax
upon the transfer by a non-resident decedent of any property
or any interest therein in trust or otherwise when the trans-
fer is by will or intestate laws on
"b. Shares of stock or certificates of interest of
corporations organized under the laws of this state
* * *, or of joint stock companies or associations or-
ganized under the laws of this state and including
all dividends and rights to subscribe to the stock of
such corporations, joint stock companies or associa-
tions. * * *" 89
Note the use of the phrase "organized under the laws of
this state." Assuming, for argument, that a fixed trust is an
association 90 it must also be "organized under the laws" of
New York if a transfer tax is to be imposed. This phrase
should be interpreted to mean "organized under the statute"
of the state of New York.91 A fixed trust is not so organized,
but depends, for its legality and existence, upon the common
law of trusts. Since trust shares do not come under the statu-
tory definition, and since, by elementary reasoning, only
' The phrase "subject to tax" is used broadly-in the sense that the state in
question has the authority to tax whether or not that authority is fully or
partially exercised.
New York Tax Law, Sec. 248.
Supra pp. 27-29, showing a fixed trust not to be an association under
the Federal Revenue Acts. The same result should be reached under the New
York statutes. See People ex rel. Manila, etc. v. Knapp, 229 N. Y. 502, 128 N, E.
892 (1920).
"' This result has been reached in the Supreme Court interpreting the phrase
"organized under the laws of the United States or of any state * * *" See
Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U. S. 178 (1910) holding a Massachusetts Trust not to be
so organized. The Court said (p. 186) : "The language of the act *** imports
an organization deriving power from statutory enactment."
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those things may be taxed which are included, no tax need be
paid in New York upon the transfer of certificates represent-
ing the trust shares.
A further question is presented in respect of the transfer
by death of the underlying securities. It may be argued that
the holder of the shares in a fixed trust is the owner, in equity,
of a fraction of each of the underlying securities-a small
fraction perhaps, but, nevertheless, it is his property and,
when this interest passes upon his death, it is subject to the
tax imposed by the laws of the states in which each of the
underlying corporations was organized.9 2
In many circulars proffered by fixed trusts the statement
is made that "for all practical purposes" the trust shares will
not be subject to multiple inheritance taxes.9 3 It is argued
that there is no tender of the stock certificate for transfer in
the state of incorporation and, consequently, there is no
means of enforcing the law or collecting the tax even if the
state had means of knowing that there had been a transfer by
death of trust shares underlying which there was a local
corporation. Such statements are probably true. One text-
writer states that at a meeting of investment trust executives,
the question was asked, "Does any one know whether a holder
of contractual trust certificates has died?" 94 If the trust cer-
tificates are registered, the trustee knows. And if the certifi-
cates are in bearer form the executor or administrator knows.
It is not an answer to the question to say that by owning trust
certificates a tax can be evaded. The honest executor or ad-
ministrator or trustee may well ask himself, "Does the law
require this tax? If so, my duty requires it to be paid." And
if the question is put to the lawyer, the ethics of his profes-
sion should compel him to frown upon an evasion of taxes at
least to the extent that he gloats over a legal avoidance of
taxes. Nor, it is submitted, is the argument strengthened by
reference to cases showing that the state in question could not
' Some corporations are incorporated in several different states. New
York Central (a favorite in fixed trusts) is incorporated not only in New
York, but also in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. Should
a tax be necessary in each state the complications are apparent.
No particular reference is made to any circular for obvious reasons.
Fowler, American Investment Trusts, p. 192.
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enforce the tax unless there was something there, upon which
it could base a status of "lienor in possession" 95 and to cases
showing that tax laws of one state have no extra-territorial
effect and cannot be enforced in another state under the due
process clause.9 6
Furthermore, such a statement of the practical effect ig-
nores the proclamations made by the taxing authorities of
three states to the effect that such interests will be taxed.9 7
Authority in any way helpful has been found only in.
New York where there are some cases, reasonably analogous,
holding that a non-resident beneficiary of a trust, the corpus
of which is stock in a New York corporation, is not subject
to the New York transfer tax on his interest. The reasoning
is that the right of the beneficiary has no interest in the stock
itself, but merely a chose in action to obtain the stock upon
the liquidation of the trust and, therefore, there is no transfer
of the stock of a New York corporation subject to tax.98
In its essence the question is this: Is the share of the
beneficiary an equitable interest in the stock of the corpora-
tions underlying the trust, or has he merely a chose in action
to obtain his interest upon the liquidation of the trust? In
spite of the clearness of the reasoning of the New York cases,
the writer is inclined to the view that an equitable ownership
more closely follows the true facts. The trust is a trust of
specific shares; it is a fixed trust. The interest of the ben-
eficiary is an interest in specific shares which cannot nor-
mally be changed, rather than an interest in a fund which
happens to be invested in those shares. It is believed that
should the case come up, a court might logically adopt this
line of thought in spite of the practical difficulties of enforce-
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 497, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, 69 L. ed.
1058 (1924).
'Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525, 63 L. ed. 1124 (1919) ; Colorado v.
Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921).
Georgia, Indiana, and New Mexico.
'Cf. re Phelps Estate, 181 App. Div. 82, 168 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1917),
where the Court stated the only question to be whether the non-resident decedent
"owned these particular shares or not." Since he did not. there was no tax.
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ment and collection, as to which we should not be concerned. 9
The title of this paper was not idly chosen. It attempts,
not a solution, but a discussion, of but a few of the many
problems connected with the creation of a comparatively new
type of financial structure. To consider them all-the ques-
tions, for instance, of state and federal stock transfer taxes,
the questions relating to the agreements by which nation-
wide distribution of the trust shares is obtained, the ques-
tions of qualification under the many and varied Blue Sky
Laws of the several states, and many others-would expand
an humble paper to the proportions and dignity of a text-
book-a work which is bound to make its appearance, for
fixed trusts are here and are here to stay. The present effort
makes no pretense of subtle reasoning or profound thinking.
It must be taken for what it has been named-merely "Some
Observations."
JOHN SHERMAN MYERS.
New York City.
'Even after deciding the interest of the beneficiary to be an equitable
interest in specific property there is the secondary question: Does the tax
statute tax equitable interests? Usually it does. See, for instance, the New York
Tax Law, Sec. 248 (lb).
The State Tax Commission has ruled trust shares not taxable. See Wall-
stein, Some Legal Questions in Relation to Investment Trusts, published by
the Corporation Trust Company, p. 26.
